Private VNFs for Collaborative Multi-operator Service Delivery: An Architectural Case by Biczók, Gergely et al.
Private VNFs for collaborative multi-operator
service delivery: an architectural case
Gergely Biczo´k, Bala´zs Sonkoly, Nikolett Bereczky
MTA-BME Future Internet Research Group
Budapest Univ. of Technology and Economics
Email: {biczok,sonkoly,nikolett.bereczky}@tmit.bme.hu
Colin Boyd
Department of Telematics
Norwegian Univ. of Science and Technology
Email: colin.boyd@item.ntnu.no
Abstract—Flexible service delivery is a key requirement for 5G
network architectures. This includes the support for collaborative
service delivery by multiple operators, when an individual oper-
ator lacks the geographical footprint or the available network,
compute or storage resources to provide the requested service to
its customer. Network Function Virtualisation is a key enabler
of such service delivery, as network functions (VNFs) can be
outsourced to other operators. Owing to the (partial lack of)
contractual relationships and co-opetition in the ecosystem, the
privacy of user data, operator policy and even VNF code could
be compromised. In this paper, we present a case for privacy
in a VNF-enabled collaborative service delivery architecture.
Speciﬁcally, we show the promise of homomorphic encryption
(HE) in this context and its performance limitations through
a proof of concept implementation of an image transcoder
network function. Furthermore, inspired by application-speciﬁc
encryption techniques, we propose a way forward for private,
payload-intensive VNFs.
I. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Proposed 5G verticals are predicted to be real value-added
services. A majority of these are projected to be delivered as
a service chain with multiple, independent business entities
contributing; either for maintaining ﬂexibility in resource al-
location or for the lack of geographical footprint. Furthermore,
users (and the market as a whole) would beneﬁt from a
streamlined, one-stop shopping experience, where the cus-
tomer only has to contact a single operator for setting up a
complex service; who would in turn outsource and subcontract
to other operators if it lacks the footprint (similar to mobile
roaming), the resource capacity or can just make a larger proﬁt.
The key enablers for such collaborative and ﬂexible multi-
operator service delivery are Software Deﬁned Networking
(SDN) and Network Function Virtualisation (NFV). NFV in
particular makes it convenient for an operator to outsource
network functions to another operators. The Horizon 2020
5GEx project aims at creating such a service delivery platform
[3].
From the technical point of view, the 5GEx architecture
enables the uniﬁed cross-domain orchestration of network and
cloud resources over multiple administrative and technology
domains [7]. Services are realized via Service Function Chain-
ing (SFC) potentially over domains of multiple operators. In
this environment, the contract structure, the lack of trust and
SFC (the path and VNFs which customer data passes through)
create a complex privacy situation (adding to general NFV
issues [5]; see Figure 1 for an example.
First, the user forms a trust relationship with its customer-
facing operator (Op1) upon buying a service and signing a
contract (Service Level Agreement, SLA). Given that Op1
potentially outsources some parts of the required service chain
to other qualiﬁed operators (Op2 and Op3), user trafﬁc will be
steered through and potentially processed by VNFs in Op2’s
and Op3’s administrative domains. Since the user does not
have a trust relationship to the subcontractors Op2 and Op3,
she might want to do something about the risk of Op2 or
Op3 looking into her trafﬁc. A logical step would be to apply
encryption at the user side, or at the egress of Op1, before
user trafﬁc leaves the premises of the trusted domain. In this
example, User 2 is the destination of User 1’s trafﬁc, therefore
he is the one to decrypt it upon arrival.
Second, VNFs usually have a policy input besides the data
trafﬁc. In the given setting, it is plausible to assume that
policies (ﬁrewall rules, ﬁlter expressions, coding parameters,
etc.) come from Op1, while the VNF is running on the
infrastructure of another operator (Op2). Now, Op1 may have a
number of reasons not to expose its policies to Op2, including
being competitors and hiding its cyber-defense strategies.
Therefore, it could be beneﬁcial for Op1 if encrypted policies
could be interpreted by the VNF. Further complicating things,
the VNF implementation could be provided by Op1, Op2 or
a third-party VNF provider [2] (not depicted in Figure 1). All
three cases require a different approach if Op1 wants to keep
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Figure 1. Multi-operator service delivery with SFC978-1-5090-0223-8/16/$31.00 c© 2016 IEEE
its policies, or even the function the VNF implements, hidden
and at the same time, successfully outsource the operation to
Op2. Even if there is a contract (and so some level of trust)
between Op1 and Op2, an honest-but-curious Op2 could still
pose problems to Op1.
Our contribution. In this paper, we ask the question: is it
possible to remedy these situations using already developed
techniques for enabling private VNFs? We believe that the
answer is both yes and no. Yes, as homomorphic encryption
seems to be a ﬁtting solution: we show how customer data,
operator policy and VNF code might be kept private to the
beneﬁt of their respective owners. We outline how homomor-
phic encryption (HE) [11] could be utilised to solve these
issues. And no, as we implement and evaluate a proof of con-
cept HE-enabled VNF prototype for image transcoding, and
demonstrate its low performance. Building on these ﬁndings
and inspired by CryptDB [16], we propose VNF class-speciﬁc
encryption as a candidate solution, where HE characteristics
can be satisﬁed via a restricted set of simpler but faster
encryption schemes. Speciﬁcally, we make a case for payload-
intensive VNFs, such as media transcoding. We also describe
potential future work; we believe that a HE capable (whether
through general HE or restricted) 5G network architecture with
VNFs could solve a number of privacy issues arising in multi-
operator service delivery.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
introduces homomorphic cryptography and its potential for
private VNFs. Section III presents our proof of concept VNF
and its performance limitations. Section IV outlines VNF
class speciﬁc encryption and future work. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. HOMOMORPHIC CRYPTO: OVERVIEW AND
APPLICABILITY IN THE NFV CONTEXT
Overview. The shift towards remote storage and processing
of data has brought new demands to secure data not only while
in transit or at rest, but also while it is undergoing processing.
The cryptographic community has responded to the demand by
developing new cryptographic tools, particularly multi-party
computation, functional encryption, and homomorphic encryp-
tion. Of these, homomorphic encryption is the appropriate
choice when private data is sent to the cloud for processing
and should be returned to users for decrypting after processing
has taken place.
While homomorphic encryption has existed for decades,
for a long time the functions which could be processed were
essentially limited to a single type of operation (either addition
or multiplication) which severely limits the application. The
conceptual breakthrough of Gentry in 2009 [11] completely
changed the picture, showing that, at least in principle, any
function can be processed on the encrypted data. This is
known as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). Gentry’s
original scheme, while theoretically “efﬁcient”, was hopelessly
impractical due to huge public keys, ciphertexts and processing
delays. Since that time there has been extensive research
activity aimed at improving the efﬁciency of FHE while, at the
same time, related encryption schemes which enable limited
forms of homomorphic computation have also been realised.
Today we have a situation where modest functions can
be processed homomorphically in what may be practical in
some scenarios. For example, the iDASH competition winners,
announced in March 2015 [1], were able to statistically pro-
cess genomic data homomorphically in under a second. This
shows that real applications can use the technology. However,
homomorphic encryption remains orders of magnitude less
efﬁcient than ordinary asymmetric (public key) encryption,
while there are theoretical grounds to believe that symmetric
key homomorphic encryption can never be achieved more
efﬁciently than asymmetric (homomorphic) encryption.
Towards a HE capable network architecture. Before
deciding on how homomorphic encryption can be applied to
protect VNFs, we should decide what we are trying to achieve
by such a step. What should we mean by private VNFs?
Privacy may be relevant for one or more of: the payload in
packets; the function used to process the packets; and the
header data.
Perhaps the most obvious aspect of privacy is to protect
the client data while it is being processed in the network.
As explained above, fulﬁlling this task is the aim of (fully)
homomorphic encryption. In the next section, we describe
a case study examining this functionality applied to image
transcoding. In principle any function can be computed, but
note that here we focus on functions which process user pay-
load: functions dealing only with header data can be processed
while user data is protected with conventional encryption.
Putting aside the efﬁciency problem for now, we note that
key management is a practical concern which needs to be
in place with suitable key exchange between the end points
before secure processing can begin. The network itself does
not need any key to process the data homomorphically.
In previous work, Melis et al. [14] use the term private
NFV to describe any scheme which protects “both the network
function and its output”. They achieved this by sending from
the client to the cloud the description of the function encrypted
homomorphically. They also implemented their scheme prov-
ing feasibility of the concept. While their work could be
useful for the policy input of VNFs in our context, they have
only considered simple functions which do not modify packet
payload: see Section IV for payload-intensive VNFs. More-
over, while they provide a security analysis and proof, their
security deﬁnitions are not as strong as would be desirable.
Another potential limitation is how to decide who should
choose the network function parameters. Should this be up
to the client? Does it need to be authenticated? Overall there
is still considerable work remaining to provide such a privacy
service on a large scale.
Hiding source and destination of packets can only be
achieved if we also encrypt packet headers. In principle this
can also be done by homomorphic encryption. However, even
if this can be done efﬁciently it is doubtful that it alone is
sufﬁcient to hide routing information without in addition using
methods to combine packets from different users as is done in
practical methods such as Tor [10]. Note that we do not deal
with this functionality in this paper.
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III. PROOF OF CONCEPT
Case study: image transcoding. As a ﬁrst step towards
the envisioned HE capable network architecture, we have
implemented a proof of concept NF prototype for the ﬁrst
use-case. The addressed function can be considered as a part
of a multi-user chat application. It is capable of sharing HE
encrypted images among the users of a given group. Based on
a predeﬁned conﬁguration parameter, a user receives an image
“transcoded” to a given quality or ﬁle size. By this means, the
sent picture is adjusted according to the characteristics of the
user’s Internet access or the contracted SLA between the user
and the service provider. In our simple example, “transcoding”
manifests in the rescaling/resizing of the image by averaging
the RGB values of contiguous blocks. Theoretically, a similar
approach can be applied to design e.g., a phone conference
NF (mixing encrypted channels) or a video transcoding NF
(adjusting the quality of encrypted video streams).
In our HE capable framework, images are sent in a HE
encrypted format to the NF where the averaging can be
performed without decrypting the content. In our current
implementation, only the summation is done by the NF while
the division is delegated to the hosts and performed on the
decrypted content. The division has the same complexity
for plain text and ciphertext, and we analyze the different
operations separately. Therefore, this is not a limitation and
the additional operation can easily be added to the NF later1.
It is worth noting, that processing encrypted images is not
a novel idea. For example, Intel designed [9] a coding scheme
and a multi-step process including GPU based encryption at
the host, image processing (resizing, cropping) at a server, and
ﬁnally decoding at the host; Zhen and Huang [19] deﬁne an
HE scheme which can compress preliminary encrypted pixels.
However as far as we know, adding an image processing NF as
a general component to an NFV framework is a new concept.
Our proof of concept prototype makes use of two open
source libraries. On the one hand, OpenCV [4] (Open Source
Computer Vision) is a widely used library in different ﬁelds of
image processing. It includes several functions and algorithms
from low-level to high-level processing tasks. On the other
hand, HElib [12] is an open source library providing essential
components of HE schemes. The currently available scheme
is the Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) [8] homomor-
phic encryption scheme with several elements improving the
efﬁciency. These components have been integrated with our
resource orchestration framework called ESCAPE [17]. ES-
CAPE is a proof of concept implementation of the SFC control
plane architecture proposed by the project EU FP7 UNIFY
[18].
Performance measurements. We have set up a simple
environment where the performance of the implemented NF
can be analyzed based on different metrics. The size of the
original image and the shrinking parameter are the relevant
inputs. Here, image transcoding/resizing is expressed by a
single shrinking parameter s deﬁning non-overlapping s × s
square blocks within the pixels, which have to be averaged.
1This was only an implementation issue because the used HE library does
not support the required operation yet.
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Figure 2. Run time of the algorithms
The run time of subsequent steps and the memory usage can
be measured during the experiments.
The experiments were conducted on a host notebook (with
1.90 GHz CPU cores, 4GB RAM, MS Windows 8.1) running
a 64 bit Ubuntu 14.04 virtual machine (with 2 cores, 2GB
RAM) on top of VirtualBox 4.3.12.
The run time results for the encryption and decryption
processes are shown in the upper part of Figure 2, respectively.
The plots show linear scaling with the number of pixels (image
size), however, the run times are extremely (unacceptably)
long. It is worth noting though that these operations have to
be performed by the hosts and not the NF.
The performance of the resizing process, i.e., averaging
(without division), done by the NF is presented by the lower
part of Figure 2. This shows an exponential dependence from
the shrinking parameter. Here we do not show the run time of
the division as it was performed at the host at a much lower
time scale (it was always within 0.06 sec).
Besides the run times, we have analyzed the memory
consumption, as well. The relevant step is the encryption
which needed approximately 150 MByte RAM per 100,000
pixels. For our largest image (1152×768), this resulted in the
allocation of almost 1.5 GByte memory, which can be deemed
impractical.
These performance results mainly characterise the used HE
library and or quite naive reference implementation. More
speciﬁcally, we used the basic data structures and supported
operations in a straightforward way, and have not applied any
optimization hacks in the implementation. To sum up, we have
showed that the concept is viable, however, there is a lot to
do for constructing and implementing HE schemes, which can
be used in real use-cases.
IV. NETWORK FUNCTION CLASS
SPECIFIC ENCRYPTION
It is clear that HE is an extremely powerful tool with a
potentially wide range of applications. However, even with
its ever-improving techniques and implementations, it is hard
to see when it will be ready for processing large amounts
of data with low delay. As payload-processing VNFs require
just that, we need to ﬁnd smart ways to improve processing
performance.
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Application-speciﬁc encryption. A promising design with
potentially far-reaching impact is presented by Popa et al. [16].
CryptDB enables processing of encrypted data by most func-
tions of SQL databases. The system builds on the fact that SQL
queries are composed of a relatively small set of operations,
such as equal to, less than, summing, sorting and joining.
Most of these already have had efﬁcient non-HE schemes
with encrypted operation; CryptDB stitched these schemes
together to cover most SQL functions. Of course, there is a
performance penalty attached compared to a traditional SQL
database, but authors claim the overhead being as low as 15-
30%. Hence, CryptDB is ﬁt for real-world usage for many
online applications built on top of databases.
Payload-intensive VNFs. Application-speciﬁc encryption
seems to suit the needs of payload-processing VNFs. As
opposed to regular (header-processing) NFs, e.g., a ﬁrewall,
these NFs actually modify packet payload or create new
packets. First, consider a media transcoder VNF: in today’s
and tomorrow’s digital content delivery, such a function can
be located at a cloud provider (such as with Envivio’s solution
[15]) or at the Internet access provider of a user of a video
streaming service, adjusting the quality of the video stream
based on user device or subscription bandwidth. Second, con-
sider the newly emerging paradigm Mobile Edge Computing
(MEC) [6]. MEC offers compute and storage capabilities (as
VNFs) at the edge of a mobile network, thereby ofﬂoad-
ing user equipment and enabling computationally intensive,
latency-critical and location-aware mobile applications. Both
for resource availability and footprint reasons, collaborative
service delivery is a viable solution for mobile operators in this
context. Potential MEC service scenarios include assistance in
sensor data aggregation and processing, autonomous vehicle
movement calculation and aggregation and video stream an-
alytics. Although completely different on the surface, media
transcoding and the various MEC-related functions rely on
similar basic building blocks: matrix operations. Thus, if we
construct an efﬁcient encrypted computation method for matrix
operations, we could potentially use it for a wide range of HE-
emulating private VNF implementations.
Future work. The lion’s share of required work lies ahead
of us. In the cryptographic context, we plan to investigate
application-speciﬁc encryption, ﬁrst with regard to matrix op-
erations. We would also like to look into HE implementations,
and improve their performance via multi-threading and ad-
vanced data structures. Moreover, a practical key management
scheme is needed for a real deployment. In the networking
context, we plan to look into more advanced capabilities
like migrating VNFs on-demand, where the statefulness of
some VNFs could introduce further challenges. The design
of contracts among the various stakeholders of the future
5G architecture (and NFV-enabled network architectures in
general) should also be emphasised. One particular area of
interest is security SLAs, which could be a game changer with
regard to trust relationships [13].
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have outlined an architectural case for
private VNFs in a multi-operator service delivery environment.
We have shown that homomorphic encryption shows some
promise; however, we demonstrated through a case study of
image transcoding that its performance is not up to real-
world use-cases in the general case. Finally, we have discussed
the potential of application-speciﬁc encryption with regard
to the class of payload-intensive VNFs. We believe that this
research topic deserves the attention of both the networking
and cryptography communities.
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